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ABSTRACT 
The infrastructure that supports New York State and its citizens is constantly faced with 
threats that test its resilience. These threats range from those brought upon by nature, and 
man-made threats, such as those from terrorists. Understanding these threats are 
persistent, and the challenge of infrastructure protection is complex. Stakeholders must 
consider methods to mitigate risk. This paper seeks to answer two questions, both of 
which strive to decrease risk over the long term for the state’s citizens. First, what are the 
benefits and challenges of the state placing a greater focus on the planning, engineering, 
and design phase for new or significantly reconstructed infrastructure? Second, how 
could a new partnership model at the state level be designed to support infrastructure 
protection activities during this phase? To accomplish these two outcomes, three 
approaches focused on planning and design within the public and private sector are 
analyzed and compared. This paper expands upon the partnership incentives utilized to 
reach desired outcomes in such infrastructure programs. Finally, this research concludes 
that the state should do more to improve safety and security during the planning, 
engineering and design phase and recommends two parallel paths forward for 
implementation at the state level.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Infrastructure protection is a simple phrase that masks the complexity of its actual nature. 
Persistent and dynamic threats place these assets, and the communities that rely upon 
them, at risk of losing their services, which can cause collateral damage, and in the worst-
case scenario, potential loss of life. Once an infrastructure project has been funded, the 
planning, engineering, and design phase of a project offers an invaluable opportunity to 
evaluate potential threats and hazards. Next, mitigation options can be explored to protect 
the asset and society throughout its operational life, and be implemented at a lower cost 
to the owner/operator than retrofitting once built.  
Many issues contribute to the challenges associated with ensuring appropriate 
infrastructure protection. Some issues, such as the aging infrastructure dilemma, are fairly 
straightforward. Others created by human nature, such as the psychology of reacting to an 
event that then skews mitigation efforts too far towards one extreme or another, can be 
extremely complex. Aggregated together with the increasing use of public and private 
partnerships and it becomes clear more should be done to improve upon current efforts. 
To understand what New York State (NYS) should do, this thesis applied a 
pragmatic qualitative approach using case studies to assess variations in assessment and 
cooperation frameworks. Recognizing the existence of the problem area, the literature 
review was leveraged to determine what has been accomplished thus far within the 
infrastructure protection field in both the public and private realm and focuses on 
planning, engineering, and design. Additionally, this review provided an informed 
understanding of the complexity of the planning and design field. With this background, 
the research questions could begin to be addressed. 
• What are the benefits and challenges of NYS placing a greater focus on 
the planning, engineering, and design phase for new or majorly 
reconstructed infrastructure?  
• How could a new partnership model at the state level be designed to 
support infrastructure protection activities during this phase?  
 
 xiii 
Three different approaches were analyzed representing the infrastructure 
spectrum: simple government, complex government, and the private sector. This analysis 
was then expanded to understand in more detail the varieties of incentives for 
participation and their general effectiveness. Two recommendations and suggested paths 
forward were then developed. These recommendations would impact state-owned and 
leased buildings and state-financed infrastructure. 
As it pertains to state-owned and leased buildings, this research recommends that 
security standards be promulgated that would apply to new or majorly reconstructed 
buildings. To that end, it is recommended that the Division of Homeland Security and 
Emergency Services (DHSES) partner with the Office of General Services; Security and 
Emergency Management Unit, and its existing membership. Leveraging smart practices 
developed by the General Services Administration (GSA), the newly formed group could 
develop standards appropriate for the state, and begin an incremental process of 
improving safety and security at its infrastructure. 
Affecting change for state-financed infrastructure is a more complex and 
challenging goal, yet one this research finds important on which to act. It is 
recommended that when state funds are provided to assist with creating a new 
infrastructure asset or major reconstruction project, the bidding and procurement process 
require the development and inclusion of a design based threat and subsequent 
development of security performance specifications. This approach would influence 
change over a broader range of assets and ensure tax dollars are spent with the citizen’s 
safety and security as a priority. 
This recommendation would assign the Office of Counter Terrorism under 
DHSES supervision as the lead for this project. Current efforts underway within the 
Rebuild NY program could be leveraged to establish a pilot project in which these 
concepts could be tested and evaluated. After review, if deemed successful, this concept 
could be implemented to the larger community with an identified minimum project 
threshold based on cost (monetary amount established to exclude minor projects), scope, 
criticality, or related characteristics. 
 xiv 
These recommended changes would be challenging to implement. Challenges, 
such as obtaining executive support, personnel constraints, and competing priorities that 
require consideration were taken into account in the development of these 
recommendations. In the end, this research concluded that those obstacles are not 
significant enough to prevent forward progress in this area.  
Overall recommended change of focus for NYS in the planning, engineering, and 
design environment will greatly assist the state’s infrastructure over the long term. 
Starting this process by first improving state-owned and leased buildings will 
demonstrate to the community that NYS takes this subject matter seriously. Additionally, 
requiring security to be a focus for assets receiving state funds will demonstrate the same 
priorities to contractors and the community. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Infrastructure protection1 is a simple phrase that masks the complexity of its 
actual nature. Persistent and dynamic threats place these assets, and the communities that 
rely upon them, at risk of losing their services, cause collateral damage, and in the worst-
case scenario, potential loss of life. Once an infrastructure project has been funded, the 
planning and design phase of a project offers an invaluable opportunity to evaluate 
potential threats and hazards. Next, mitigation options can be explored to protect the asset 
and society throughout its operational life, and implemented at a lower cost to the 
owners/operators than retrofitting once built. This thesis explores how safety and security 
can effectively be incorporated during the planning and design phase. 
A. DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
In New York State (NYS), the most recent disaster that dramatically affected the 
community was Hurricane Sandy. As with most events that create a great deal of 
devastation, public and private stakeholders have placed a tremendous focus since the 
incident on understanding what has occurred, identifying lessons learned, and 
establishing plans to mitigate future risk. Although the scale and scope of the review of 
Hurricane Sandy is massive and wide ranging, significant time and effort was spent 
focusing on the state’s infrastructure. Governor Andrew M. Cuomo formed three 
commissions charged with reviewing and providing recommendations to improve the 
state’s ability to endure future threats and hazards: the NYS 2100 Commission, the NYS 
Respond Commission, and the NYS Ready Commission.2 Each commission incorporated 
and considered state infrastructure within its review. Similar efforts and reviews have 
occurred at local jurisdictional levels as well; the New York City (NYC) Hurricane 
1 Infrastructure protection is the efforts taken by all relevant stakeholders to ensure the environment 
that the asset could affect is safe and secure. 
2 Governor’s Press Office, Governor Cuomo Announces Commissions to Improve New York State’s 
Emergency Preparedness and Response Capabilities, and Strengthen the State’s Infrastructure to 
Withstand Natural Disasters (New York State: November 28, 2012).  
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Sandy After Action Report highlighted and recommended major improvements to 
essential community services and business infrastructure recovery efforts.3  
The NYS 2100 Commission Report concluded, “It is incumbent upon the State to 
plan, finance, fund and support a range of infrastructure solutions in order to ensure that 
our economy and communities are resilient in the 21st century.”4 Through the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), 
the state is managing a grant program available to local governments to address areas, 
such as the following.5 
• Reducing the risk of flood damage at government, non-profit and private 
sector assets 
• Mitigating vulnerabilities on transportation, communications, and energy 
assets 
• Implementing eligible mitigation recommendations identified within the 
NYS Commission reports 
As these necessary solutions become real projects, infrastructure stakeholders will be 
faced with the challenges of the planning, engineering, and design phase leading to a 
successful project completion. The NYS government will be providing financial 
resources in support of many of these projects; what responsibilities does it carry to 
ensure the goal of resilience is achieved? How can it best live up to these responsibilities? 
For the purpose of this thesis, NYS infrastructure resilience will be addressed by 
exploring how the government can be more proactive than reactive with regards to 
improving infrastructure’s ability to withstand and adapt to shocks and disasters, or to be 
brought back on line quickly following such events. Winston Churchill once said, “Never  
 
 
3 Linda Gibbs and Caswell Holloway, Hurricane Sandy After Action: Report and Recommendations to 
Major Michael R. Bloomberg, New York City, NY, 2013.  
4 Kevin E. McCarthy et al., Recommendations on Improving Infrastructure Resilience Post-Sandy 
(Hartford, CT: Connecticut General Assembly, Office of Legislative Research, 2013).  
5 New York State Office of Emergency Management, “Hazard Mitigation Grant Program,” n.d., 
http://stormrecovery.ny.gov/content/hazard-mitigation-grant-program-hmgp-0.  
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let a good crisis go to waste.”6 NYS is leveraging this concept as federal and state funds 
are earmarked for addressing solutions identified by reports, such as the NYS 2100 
Commission Report.  
While undergoing the effort of creating a more resilient 21st century through 
improving NYS infrastructure, it is in the state’s best interest to ensure it does not 
become too narrowly focused on the threat of Mother Nature. It is natural to prioritize the 
risk that is most fresh in people’s minds; however, excluding other relevant threats from 
consideration during the mitigation process may create missed opportunities. With the 
continuing demonstrated intent of terrorists to attack this nation’s homeland, it is critical 
for policies and programs to include the consideration of man-made threats, as well as 
natural hazards. Foiled attempts to attack the Empire State, such as those by Faisal 
Shahzad, Najibullah Zazi, and Jose Pimental, make this issue even more relevant for 
NYS. It is important to remember the lessons learned from 9/11 and ensure failure of 
imagination does not impact the community once again.  
At certain moments in history, multiple problems and opportunities collide, which 
dramatically increases the importance of decisions to be made. Within a relatively short 
timeframe, NYS has experienced major man-made and natural disasters that have 
strained the governmental system.7 Citizens expect government to ensure the services 
and support that infrastructure provides them are reliable and protected. To that end, the 
government can utilize many approaches and methods to meet or manage this 
expectation. This nation’s infrastructure can be protected in many ways; it is a 
government’s challenge to determine what is most effective, efficient, and appropriate.  
The work explores this infrastructure protection problem area in more detail, and 
discusses several reasons why NYS may not be effectively evaluating and incorporating 
risk considerations during planning and design. The issues described as follows are  
 
6 Attributed to Winston Churchill; original source not found. GoodReads, “Never Let a Good Crisis 
Go to Waste,” n.d., http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/717228-never-let-a-good-crisis-go-to-waste. 
7 Governmental systems include transportation systems, utilities, and support networks, such as 
emergency management systems. 
 3 
                                                 
present at the strategic, policy and operational levels. Although each section is presented 
individually, these issues interweave among each other, which can significantly 
complicate the problem.  
1. Pitfalls of Reacting to an Event 
Although some clear advantages exist to leveraging a tragic event, such as 9/11 or 
Hurricane Sandy, to affect change in infrastructure (both physical changes and policy 
changes), some problems can also arise. The ability to understand and evaluate risk can 
play an important role in identifying mitigation in the planning, engineering, and design 
phase. The first component of understanding risk is identifying threats. Although 
identifying all relevant threats could be most beneficial to the risk process, funds 
available to rebuild damaged assets may not allow for mitigation of threats not directly 
tied to the recovery effort underway. 
The Metropolitan Transit Authority’s (MTA) South Ferry Station was evaluated 
to demonstrate this issue. Although this example is being utilized to examine the 
challenges at hand, it is clear that in hindsight, it is easy to second guess decisions that 
were made in a very challenging environment. It is also acknowledged that the subway 
system had not faced a threat as extensive as Hurricane Sandy throughout its entire 
history. However, perhaps the same will be said for the next terrorist attack that could 
occur in NYS, and for that reason, stakeholders must continue to challenge the status quo 
to ensure the safety and security of the community.  
As a result of the successful terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, in NYC, the 
subway system was significantly damaged.8 This devastating structural damage wreaked 
havoc on the city. However, in the wake of this destruction, post-9/11 recovery funds 
provided an opportunity for the MTA to rebuild and enhance system capabilities.9  
8 Metropolitan Transit Authority, “Remembering and Rebuilding After 9/11,” September 10, 2010, 
http://new.mta.info/news/2010/09/10/remembering-and-rebuilding-after-9-11.  
9 Metropolitan Transit Authority, “Restoring South Ferry Station,” n.d., http://web.mta.info/nyct/ 
service/RestoringSouthFerryStation.htm.  
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The new South Ferry Station, which opened its doors in 2009, was the pride of the 
subway system. It boasted improved operational capability, enhanced security features, 
and green building compliance. With 9/11 most certainly present and vivid in the 
engineer’s minds, security was very likely a prioritized factor in the construction. With a 
$545 million dollar price tag, the threat identification and mitigation process could (and 
perhaps should) have also included a focus on flooding. A quick look at the existing 100-
year flood zone maps visualizes this threat: 
 
Figure 1.  New York State 100-year Flood Zone Overlay10 
The threat of flooding was known and relevant. The unknown question is whether 
or not it was included within the risk discussion—or at least to what extent it was 
addressed. However, it appears that the majority of components were not protected from 
10 Mapping Source: NYS Critical Infrastructure Response Information System; created by the author. 
This overlay visual demonstrates how South Ferry Station is located in a 100- year flood zone, which 




                                                 
the threat of flooding. With an anticipated $600 million dollar price tag, a commitment 
has been made to rebuild South Ferry Station in the wake of Hurricane Sandy. According 
to the MTA, “engineers are studying whether some of the vital electrical infrastructure 
can be moved to higher ground.” Perhaps a start, but it should have been done prior to the 
first half billion-dollar reconstruction.  
2. Risk Issues Addressing Man-Made Threats; Acceptable versus 
Unacceptable 
Similar to the concerns described over the state developing a “tunnel vision” 
about recent or vivid threats, the issue of tunnel vision can also affect infrastructure 
owners/operators themselves. When infrastructure projects are approved to move 
forward, stakeholders intimately involved with the project begin a planning, engineering, 
and design phase that involves the consideration of many risk issues—ranging from 
financial risks (like cost overruns and insurance) to operational risks (like security and 
disaster response). Certain considerations and applications are simple, guided by 
standards and codes, which force the mitigation of risk for assets to be built in particular 
locales or for particular purposes. Obligations, such as those required for fire codes, 
communicate effectively that certain risks are considered unacceptable. The same can be 
said for standards and codes that deem certain building materials or techniques 
unacceptable for earthquake prone areas. 
However, when security is considered with regard to man-made threats, 
discussions on acceptable risk are more uncertain. Individual owner/operators make 
judgment calls based upon the information and expertise available at the time of the 
infrastructure project conception and execution. Given the immense nature of the 
infrastructure environment, project stakeholders will most certainly utilize a variety of 
methods and processes to reach logical positions concerning the incorporation—or lack 
of incorporation—of security measures. In the end, decisions are made regarding 
infrastructure that supports the community and the construction budget, which often 
allow owners/operators to make the final determination in terms of the level of security 
risk they are willing to accept. 
 6 
In some cases, infrastructure projects may miss the mark completely about one of 
the core components of evaluating risk in a comprehensive manner11 (threat, 
vulnerability, and consequence12). Consider the following two basic examples in which 
the risk picture may be compromised in evaluating security considerations.  
• A contractor is hired to assist with addressing physical security 
incorporation into the design of infrastructure. The contractor has a strong 
background in target hardening and applications, which could be applied 
through architectural design to mitigate consequences. However, the 
contractor relies on the owner/operator to communicate the threats to the 
facility. The designated individual on the project team tasked with 
developing the threat has no background in developing threat assessments 
and no analytical capabilities to research historical, current, and future 
concerns for the infrastructure type.  
• A new asset is being built on a campus environment. Given the sensitivity 
of work and equipment planned to be located within the new asset, a 
comprehensive security team has been established to conduct a risk 
assessment for the asset to provide design guidance prior to architectural 
drafting. Although the team performs with a high-level competence, the 
project has ignored new vulnerability and consequences considerations for 
existing assets that will now be located adjacent to the new infrastructure.  
The scenarios described above barely scratch the surface of the complexities and 
potential errors and omissions, which may occur during the planning, engineering and 
design phase. Like anything else, to expect a perfect outcome for every infrastructure 
project would be naive. However, to protect the interests of the community, government 
entities must be aware of these complexities and be prepared to step in and become a 
partner, which is especially the case when the owners’/operators’ determination of 
acceptable risk could negatively affect public safety. 
11 Department of Homeland Security, “DHS Risk Lexicon,” September 2008, http://www.dhs. 
gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs_risk_lexicon.pdf. The commonly accepted components of risk are threat, 
vulnerability, and consequence. Threat involves a process of evaluating entities, actions, or occurrences, 
whether natural or man-made, that have or indicate the potential to harm life, information, operations, 
and/or property. Vulnerability evaluates the physical feature or operational attribute that renders an entity 
open to exploitation or susceptible to a given hazard. Consequence identifies the impacts or effect of an 
event, incident, or occurrence. 
12 Ibid. 
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3. Aging Infrastructure 
In 2013, the American Society of Civil Engineers issued a report card 
highlighting infrastructure of concern for the nation and states.13 Surveying a variety of 
infrastructure stakeholder organizations, the report demonstrates that many states, New 
York included, have some major infrastructure areas of concern that are in need of 
improvement. Several highlights specific to New York from the report are as follows. 
• 39.6% of New York’s bridges are structurally deficient or functionally 
obsolete. 
• Drinking and wastewater investment needs are $56.7 million over the next 
20 years. 
• Public facilities have $96.5 million in unmet system and infrastructure 
funding needs. 
As infrastructure—nationwide and in New York State—continues to face deficiencies 
and the risks of becoming obsolete, it becomes increasingly vulnerable to man-made and 
natural threats. Although a variety of reasons for these deficiencies arise from economic 
instability, weak oversight and more, the concept of the tragedy of the commons14 
summarizes the issues well. With a large portion of the aging infrastructure described 
above being publicly owned (including roads, bridges, waterways, etc), the community 
utilizes these assets and resources. Everyone within the community requires these assets 
to exist and society benefits from their presence; however, they generate little or no 
tangible profit despite the fact that costs do arise from their maintenance, and as such, it 
becomes difficult to maintain and/or improve them. Additionally, when opportunities 
arise to improve this infrastructure, a natural conflict over the scarce funding resources 
available occurs, which forces cost-benefit analysis to happen and priorities to be 
established.  
13 American Society of Civil Engineers, “Report Card for America’s Infrastructure,” n.d., 
http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/. 
14 Garrett James Hardin and American Association for the Advancement of Science, The Tragedy of 
the Commons (Washington, DC: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1968).  
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4. Uneven Focus on the Operational Life Cycle 
Understanding that infrastructure has been a target of interest for terrorist 
organizations and other groups, as well as individuals with criminal intent, it is 
reasonable to see a focus placed on protecting this nation’s infrastructure. However, 
overwhelmingly at the federal,15 state, and local levels of government, available 
resources working to mitigate the risks associated with the terrorist or criminal threat are 
often focused on improving NYS’s resiliency on assets within the operations and 
maintenance phase, and for the most part, overlook those entering the planning, 
engineering, and design phase.  
Historically, the subject matter expertise (often physical security experts) that has 
been leveraged to assist with infrastructure protection lends its expertise well to analyzing 
and supporting the operations and maintenance phase. The most common occupations 
and careers held by professionals with physical security expertise are from the 
Department of Defense and law enforcement. These individuals have built their 
knowledge base around protecting and enhancing existing assets. Conducting 
assessments on existing infrastructure assets is natural for these individuals because it is 
familiar and what they have done on a routine basis. Security and risk analysis in the 
planning, engineering, and design phase do not fit comfortably with established 
infrastructure security personnel and processes. The planning, engineering and design 
phase requires conceptualizing an asset through drawings and discussions with architects 
and engineers. It requires new partnerships and planning methods to prepare the security 
discussion that often are not required for an asset that has already been built. These news 
partnerships and planning methods require formal adoption into the project processes and 
recognition at inception.  
NYS has local assessment teams from large cities (New York City, Albany, and 
Syracuse), the NYS Office of Counter Terrorism Critical Infrastructure Protection Unit, 
as well as assigned protective security advisors16 from the Department of Homeland 
15 This does not include General Services Administration. 
16 Four protective security advisors are assigned to New York. 
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Security (DHS) all focused almost exclusively on existing infrastructure. Of the teams 
described, few are proactively positioning themselves for the collaboration and 
consultation that should occur as these new projects begin. 
Finally, grant funds available to assist with the mitigation of risk for the 
infrastructure environment have also historically encouraged a focus on assets within the 
operational and maintenance phase. Grants, such as the federal Buffer Zone Protection 
Program, targeted existing assets, which met federal criteria to be considered significant. 
Additionally, national infrastructure prioritization programs encourage state and local 
efforts to work with, research, and justify existing infrastructure assets that would meet 
national criteria, which in turn, is utilized as part of the risk formula to allocate grant 
funds. These efforts do not consider infrastructure to be built or infrastructure about to 
begin a major reconstruction17 phase. By recognizing issues with design early during the 
process, infrastructure funds will be saved and fewer mitigation efforts required once 
built. An example would be the incorporation of standoff for a building. Identifying the 
need for standoff distance during the conceptual phase of a project would simply require 
a new conceptual draft, which included a buffer zone between the parking lot and 
building. However, recognizing the need for standoff distance once the parking lot has 
been constructed would require similar redesign expenses and significant reconstruction 
costs. In a 2004 cost analysis study focused on interoperability, the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology provides a clear picture of the financial impacts recognized by 
an asset at different life-cycle steps (Figure 2).18 
17 Major reconstruction is defined for this thesis as projects, which change 40% or more of the asset. 
18 Michael P. Gallaher and Robert E. Chapman, Cost Analysis of Inadequate Interoperability in the 
U.S. Capital Facilities Industry (Gaithersburg, MD: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Technology Administration, 
National Institute of Standards and Technology 2004). 
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Figure 2.  Cost of a Design Change Chart19 
Understanding the increased financial burden this nation’s infrastructure 
stakeholders incur as their life-cycle progresses, coupled with what is understood about 
the relative nature of infrastructure, suggests the current heavily weighted focus of 
partnering with assets during the operational life-cycle is not the best application of 
limited resources. 
All the aforementioned issues, and visualized in Figure 3, impact the overall 
infrastructure quality, which supports the community. 
19 Gallaher and Chapman, Cost Analysis of Inadequate Interoperability in the U.S. Capital Facilities 
Industry. 
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Figure 3.  Infrastructure Protection Problem Space 
Each issue on its own is complex, and if left unaddressed, could have negative long-term 
impacts concerning safety and security. Preparing stakeholders to participate effectively 
and efficiently in the planning, engineering, and design phase when the opportunity 
arises, may improve the state’s overall resilience. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Important work has taken place historically to lower the risk associated with 
terrorism for NYS. Within the DHSES, the Office of Counter Terrorism (OCT), the 
Critical Infrastructure Protection Unit (OCT-CI) has developed goals to assist 
infrastructure stakeholders and protect the community. Although OCT-CI’s 
organizational structure has changed several times, its mission and goals have remained 
consistent. 
The Critical Infrastructure Unit supports federal, state and local 
comprehensive risk analysis to reduce the Nation’s vulnerability to 
terrorism and deny the use of critical infrastructure as a weapon by 
implementing plans and programs that identify, catalog, prioritize, and 
protect people and assets in cooperation with all levels of government and 
private sector.20  
20 Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services, “Critical Infrastructure Protection Unit,” 
n.d., http://www.dhses.ny.gov/oct/units/critical-infrastructure-protection/.  
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In support of this mission and in response to historical events, the NYS 
Legislature placed several mandates into law, which apply directly to the unit. 
NYS Exec Law Art. 26 §709 (j): Work with local, state and federal 
agencies and private entities to conduct assessments of the vulnerability of 
critical infrastructure to terrorist attack, including, but not limited to, 
nuclear facilities, power plants, telecommunications systems, mass 
transportation systems, public roadways, railways, bridges and tunnels, 
and develop strategies that may be used to protect such infrastructure from 
terrorist attack.  
NYS Exec Law Art. 26 §709 (k): Develop plans that may be used to 
promote rapid recovery from terrorist attacks and other natural and man-
made disasters, to ensure prompt restoration of transportation, utilities, 
critical communications and information systems and to protect such 
infrastructure. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis challenged the infrastructure protection status quo interpretation of the 
NYS executive laws identified above. Striving to obtain the ultimate goal of a resilient 
state, it will explore earlier opportunities for partnership and mitigation. To accomplish 
this outcome, two basic questions are asked. 
• What are the benefits and challenges of NYS placing a greater focus on 
the planning, engineering, and design phase for new or majorly 
reconstructed infrastructure?  
• How could a new partnership model at the state level be designed to 
support infrastructure protection activities during this phase?  
Several key assumptions guide this research. First, infrastructure projects, no matter 
whether they are large or small, are complex and require significant collaboration and 
coordination with a multitude of stakeholders. Second, a natural pressure exists within all 
infrastructure projects concerning the customer-client relationship. No matter how 
genuine and committed to the greater good or success of the project, some stakeholders 
will be pressured to ensure a profit while others will focus on other societal goods; these 
sometimes conflicting pressures can negatively impact final outcomes. Third, this work 
addresses the concept of infrastructure at the macro level. It strives to examine 
infrastructure holistically, in an attempt to gain perspective and direction from which 
more detailed micro efforts could be born. Finally, when it comes to the safety and 
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security of citizens, NYS will ultimately be held accountable for its actions taken to 
protect its infrastructure from attack. Whether the infrastructure is public or privately 
owned will be insignificant, even if the constraints on protection efforts are vastly 
different. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A broad body of research—from public sector entities, practitioners, researchers 
and scholars—has been studied and written on these important issues. The most 
applicable and relevant analysis has occurred since 2001 because of the changing 
conception of security following the terrorist attacks of 9/11. This literature review 
focuses on that time period.  
A. PUBLIC 
Since 9/11, critical infrastructure protection has received a significant level of 
focus and attention. Guidance documents have been developed at various levels of 
government, and have in some cases, shaped the way infrastructure protection is 
accomplished. A seminal document for this practice is the National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan (NIPP).21 Considered by many within the infrastructure protection 
community as a key foundational document, this plan provides a scalable framework for 
public partners to implement infrastructure protection activities. 
While the NIPP does a thorough job identifying what components are required to 
assess risk (threat, vulnerability, and consequence), it does not consider that this nation’s 
infrastructure is ever changing. Throughout the document, little consideration was given 
to what may be to come concerning new or majorly re-constructed infrastructure. Given 
how much infrastructure resides within the state that is in need of repair or 
modernization, this consideration is important. In this sense, the framework is a limiting, 
or at least limited, factor for those agencies attempting to begin infrastructure protection 
activities in their community. 
Although the NIPP is the most updated and comprehensive national framework 
for infrastructure protection, it is certainly not the only plan, strategy, or other guiding 
document that can help in understanding the overall foundation of infrastructure 
protection. An important foundational document was published on infrastructure 
21 United States and the Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2006), 179.  
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protection called the National Strategy for Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure 
and Key Assets;22 similar to the NIPP, it provides guidance for infrastructure protection 
and a proposed path forward. Developed prior to the NIPP in 2003, this document 
developed a strategy, which included guiding principles and objectives to implement the 
Presidents National Strategy for Homeland Security.23 Additionally, the State, Local, 
Tribal and Territorial Government Coordinating Council has published reviews by region 
of infrastructure protection programs that provide a greater understanding of how state 
and locals are implementing infrastructure protection activities on a regular basis. 
Information found within the Final Report: Region VI Critical Infrastructure Protection 
Programs provides significant information on local activities, best practices and 
challenges, and/or unmet goals. This information provides key insight into whether other 
state and local communities have considered operating within the planning, engineering 
and design life-cycle phase. 
In addition to these documents, which have detailed frameworks and strategies, a 
review of more risk assessment focused documents provides a more detailed look at this 
environment. Similar to the NIPP, another work, such as the Building and Infrastructure 
Protection Series, provides a solid foundation.24 This series of documents begins to 
address some of the more tangible aspects of infrastructure protection. One example is a 
document created in 2010 called Aging Infrastructure: Issues, Research, and Technology. 
This paper addresses concerns with the state of United States (U.S.) infrastructure and 
provides credible information on the need for new infrastructure and/or major 
reconstruction of existing infrastructure. Such documents demonstrate that NYS and the 
United States may be entering into a period of increased major re-construction and new 
infrastructure projects. 
22 United States and the Department of Homeland Security, The National Strategy for the Physical 
Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 
for sale by the Supt. of Docs, U.S. GPO, 2003), 83.  
23 Ibid. 
24 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, “DHS Building and 
Infrastructure Protection Series Tools,” n.d., http://www.dhs.gov/building-and-infrastructure-protection-
series-tools-0.  
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B. PRIVATE 
It would be naïve to assume that the private sector is not already including 
security considerations into their planning, engineering, and design life cycles. Literature 
suggests that architects and engineers are most certainly involving and including security 
into their curricula, advanced educations, and overall process recommendations. One 
example is a book developed by the American Institute of Architects called Security 
Planning and Design; A Guide for Architects and Building Professionals.25 This book 
takes the professional through reasoning as to why a professional should incorporate 
security considerations, and walks the individual through examples of structural and non-
structural physical security considerations.  
As with the public sector, private organizations have also focused efforts on a 
more micro scale. Established as a not-for-profit organization; ASIS International26 is 
one example of a large organization leveraged by the private sector and is committed 
towards advancing security for the community. ASIS is a professional association for 
security practitioners across a host of different industries. In addition to the certifications, 
which ASIS provides, it has a vast library of security and planning documents that 
provide a solid understanding of best practices and lessons learned. One example is the 
fifth edition of the Handbook of Loss Prevention and Crime Prevention.27  This literature 
in many ways runs parallel to what exists in the public side, although with a focus on 
balancing security measures with other organizational priorities (like profits and 
controlling costs), and provides an excellent opportunity for review and comparison. 
Another area with literature ripe for review is the area of whole building design,28 
a program of the National Institute of Building Sciences. Additionally, the American 
Institute of Architects has published a guide for a concept call Integrated Project Delivery 
25 Joseph A. Demkin and American Institute of Architects, Security Planning and Design: A Guide for 
Architects and Building Design Professionals (Hoboken, NJ: J. Wiley & Sons, 2004), 240.  
26 ASIS International, “American Society for Industrial Security,” n.d., https://www.asisonline. 
org/Pages/default.aspx.  
27 “Research and Markets: Handbook of Loss Prevention and Crime Prevention: Edition No. 5,” 
Journal of Engineering (September 26, 2012): 1245. 
28 National Institute of Building Sciences, “Whole Building Design Guide,” n.d., http://www.wbdg. 
org/. 
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(IPD). IPD focuses on increasing the partnerships and efforts during early design to gain 
efficiency and effectiveness through the whole project. Similar to what the governmental 
programs have done, this private industry group has developed a framework for 
infrastructure professionals to assist them through the planning, engineering, and design 
phase. Included within this framework are sections focused on physical security, blast 
mitigation, and other structural aspects, which have relevance within the infrastructure 
protection world. In addition to literature available for review on this topic, the Institute 
provides case study examples for infrastructure, which have leveraged this information 
during the development of their assets. 
C. PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 
Any policy decisions made within this environment will warrant strong 
understanding and consideration of the public-private partnership. Issues, such as the 
challenges of sharing information and overcoming concerns related to liability, are 
examples of real problems, which are roadblocks to achieving a successful partnership.29 
Most recently in a response to Executive Order (EO) 13636, Booz Allen Hamilton 
described the issues about enhanced cyber security implementation as a lack of return on 
investment and an absence of intermediaries.30 
Although this topic remains a challenge at all levels of government—with regards 
to identifying the best path forward—no lack of literature exists on characteristics for 
success and identification of core components. An article written by Fred Becker and 
Valerie Patterson focused on balancing returns, risks, and roles between the partnerships, 
which identifies positive association between risk and rewards as a key element for 
success.31 Additionally, literature is available that focuses more specifically on this 
29 Sue Eckert, Protecting Critical Infrastructure: The Role of the Private Sector, Ridgway Center 
Working Papers, 2005. 
30 John McConnell, Re: Notice of Inquiry—Incentives to Adopt Improved Cybersecurity Practices. 
(Docket Number 130206155-3155-01) (Booze Allen Hamilton, 2013).  
31 Fred Becker and Valerie Patterson, “Public: Private Partnerships: Balancing Financial Returns, 
Risks, and Roles of the Partners,” Public Performance & Management Review 29, no. 2 (December 2005), 
125–144.  
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partnership and lessons learned on an international level, as seen within an article 
focusing on hospitals entering the contractual and design phase.32 
D. EXPANDED PLANNING AND DESIGN EFFORTS 
Finally, several works have been completed that align very closely with the topic 
and focus of this thesis. With 9/11 serving as a catalyst for efforts to improve overall 
security for high-rise buildings, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) published 
a document called Engineering Security: Protective Design for High Risk Buildings.33 
The document provides a structured guide as to how to “tier” an asset type (i.e., assess its 
risk level) and then apply specific recommended security considerations into the design 
of the asset. Additionally, it discusses and recognizes the struggle government and the 
private sector have concerning striking a balance between security and all the other 
administrative and operational focuses with which the private sector must deal. 
The Building Security Handbook for Architectural Planning and Design34 
provides a comprehensive look at security in design and leverages a deep bench of 
subject matter experts to address the issue. Focusing on case studies from 9/11 and other 
recent events, the authors share lessons learned and discuss mitigation efforts that could 
be leveraged to make infrastructure more secure. With the majority of the work focusing 
on planning and design, different building types are explored in detail to provide best 
practices and security recommendations for each type. Additionally, focus is placed on 
the lack of codes relating directly to security, and how, in the absence of these codes, 
groups can leverage information that exists. Finally, this work reviews the fiscal issues 
related to implementing security in design and construction. 
32 Pedro Pita Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt, “Contractual Design and PPPs for Hospitals: Lessons 
for the Portuguese Model,” The European Journal of Health Economics 10, no. 4 (October 2009), 437–
453. 
33 New York City Police Department, Engineering Security: Protective Design for High Risk 
Buildings, 2009. 
34 Barbara A. Nadel, Building Security: Handbook for Architectural Planning and Design (New York, 
NY: McGraw-Hill, 2004). 
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The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) utilizes a process at nuclear 
facilities called Design Basis Threat (DBT).35 This process strives to evaluate the threats 
that could have high consequences and apply the appropriate levels of physical security 
protections to mitigate the identified threat.36 Although the process is quite involved, two 
main components are emphasized. First a detailed threat assessment is completed, and 
second, an assessment and decision making process develops the DBT.37 
Ultimately, this process assists the regulatory method with identifying allocation 
of resources. DBT offers a logical process for identifying attributes and characteristics of 
the adversary, which could be leveraged in the development of performance 
specifications.38 Another benefit of utilizing DBT is that in addition to identifying threats 
that could have high consequences, it also excludes threats with minimal identified 
consequences.39 
It should be noted that DBT has not come without controversy and critique over 
the process. In a recent review of DBT; Kuperman and Kirkham challenge its use of 
nuclear facilities and evaluate alternative methods.40 Although options, such as game 
theory and improving the security culture are explored, they conclude that each option 
has its own issues and may not necessarily provide a higher quality output. However, the 
study did find that the DBT process should be made more rational.41 
35 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Implementing Guide, Development, Use and Maintenance of 
the Design Basis Threat,” IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 10, 2009, http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/ 
publications/PDF/Pub1386_web.pdf. 
36 Ibid., foreword. 
37 Ibid., 13. 
38 Ibid., 21. 
39 Ibid., 22. 
40 Lara Kirkham with Alan J. Kuperman, “Protecting U.S. Nuclear Facilities from Terrorist Attack: 
Re-Assessing the Current “Design Basis Threat” Approach,” The University of Texas Blog Service, August 
15, 2013, blogs.utexas.edu/nppp/files/2013/08/NPPP-working-paper-1-2013-Aug-15.pdf. 
41 Ibid., 8. 
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III. METHOD 
The methodology of this thesis is to apply a pragmatic qualitative approach using 
case studies to assess variations in assessment and cooperation frameworks. Recognizing 
the existence of the infrastructure protection problem area, the literature review was 
leveraged to determine what has been accomplished thus far within the infrastructure 
protection field in both the public and private realm focusing on planning, engineering, 
and design. Additionally, this review provided an informed understanding of the 
complexity of the planning, engineering, and design field. With this background, the 
research questions could begin to be addressed. 
• What are the benefits and challenges of NYS placing a greater focus on 
the planning, engineering and design phase for new or majorly 
reconstructed infrastructure?  
• How could a new partnership model at the state level be designed to 
support infrastructure protection activities during this phase?  
To answer the first question, several public and private approaches were studied and 
analyzed, understanding the range of potential benefits and challenges could vary greatly. 
In recognizing the complexity of the infrastructure environment, three mini-case studies 
were selected to embody the infrastructure spectrum: simple government, complex 
government, and the private sector. The following entities were selected for the mini-case 
studies. 
• U.S. General Services Administration (GSA): Representing the simple 
government approach, the GSA has control and authority of most federal 
buildings. The GSA implements a standardized and mandated program, 
which emphasizes incorporating safety and security in planning and 
design. 
• United Kingdom (UK): Analyzed as the complex government approach, 
the United Kingdom has publicly available documentation focused on 
infrastructure protection that demonstrates a logical progression. This 
approach utilizes a voluntary participation approach. 
• Whole Building Design & Design Build: Selected as the private sector 
approach, this approach has gained recent traction for infrastructure 




projects and is considering expanding the allowable scope. Additionally, 
privately owned infrastructure assets are utilizing the process as well. This 
approach utilizes a fiscal incentive participation. 
This sampling provides a structured and focused comparison of public and private 
efforts utilizing various levels of complexity.42 Throughout the review of these cases, the 
following questions were asked. 
• What method is utilized to affect change? 
• What are considered the key elements for success? 
• Have smart practices43 been identified? 
• Are there known challenges and roadblocks that exist and remain 
unresolved? 
The second question was addressed by focusing on the varieties of incentives for 
participation. Leveraging information collected in the mini-case studies. Potential 
participation incentives include voluntary, regulatory, and fiscally incentivized. Although 
not specifically associated with planning, engineering, and design, the infrastructure 
protection community has multiple programs and projects that correlate with the change 
agent methods identified during the first phase of this research. Programs and projects 
were selected for inclusion, review, and analysis if they have been utilized and/or 
leveraged in NYS and fit within one of the identified participation incentive categories. 
The goal of the analysis was to gain a broader understanding and knowledge base on 
participation incentive options and identify potential categorical strengths and 
weaknesses.  
Finally, the research concludes with a recommendation that challenges the NYS 
infrastructure protection status quo and argues it should be restructured or re-
conceptualized. To execute this alternative approach, a foundational plan was developed 
that assists NYS with addressing a segment of this problem. Additionally,  
 
42 George Alexander and Bennet Andrew, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University, 2005), 71. 
43 Eugene Bardach, “Part Three: “Smart (Best) Practices”—Research: Understanding and Making Use 
of What Look Like Good Ideas from Somewhere Else,” in Practical Guide for Policy Analysis, The 
Eightfold Path to More Effective Problem Solving, 4th ed. (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 2012).  
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recommendations for future research analysis required to continue to mitigate concerns 
related to the evaluation of risk and implementation of security measures for 
infrastructure are discussed.  
 23 
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IV. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE APPROACHES 
Historically, within NYS, the security design component responsibilities of 
infrastructure projects have been left to the architectural and engineering contractors and 
interested/assigned employees from the owner/operator team. Although trained in 
applying best practices for safety and security, design teams can be placed in situations in 
which owner and operator requests, political ambitions, and funds available force 
difficult decisions and “trade-offs” to be made. Those that depend on this infrastructure, 
which will exist within the state for the long term, may benefit from enhanced 
collaboration approaches that explore in more depth the concepts of risk (threat, 
vulnerability, and consequences).  
To discover how stakeholders could benefit from this enhanced focus, it is 
beneficial to look within and outside the continental boundaries to see how some 
organizations and groups are approaching planning and design. The literature review 
revealed three groups that have taken a proactive approach towards incorporating safety 
and security into planning, engineering, and design. The mini-case studies that follow 
provide insight into how these groups approach infrastructure protection. They 
demonstrate the American Society of Civil Engineers mantra: “The long-term viability of 
any Critical Infrastructure System—no matter how resilient and sustainable it is—will 
ultimately rely on the human and organizational stewardship the infrastructure system 
receives.”44 
A. SIMPLE GOVERNMENT: U.S. GENERAL SERVICES 
ADMINISTRATION 
Although a large federal organization, the GSA was reviewed to represent a 
simple government approach, which for this thesis, is defined as an approach that has 
been developed to influence only the assets under its direct internal control. With the 
exception of Department of Defense facilities and a few other select departments, the 
44 ASCE Critical Infrastructure Guidance Task Committee, Guiding Principles for the Nation’s 
Critical Infrastructure (Reston, VA: American Society of Civil Engineers, 2009), 40.  
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GSA is responsible for administering and managing federal agency space requirements.45 
Through this responsibility, it has been empowered with the control to administer and 
manage required programs. Through this charge, it is evident that it places a premium on 
planning, engineering, and design to ensure safe and secure properties and it is a stout 
steward for federal infrastructure. 
With approximately $10 billion of work focused on new, major renovations, and 
other similar work, the GSA leans heavily on its concept of design excellence to ensure 
community funds are being spent in the best and most appropriate way possible.46 Within 
its Design Excellence Planning Guide,47 the importance and weight placed on 
collaboration becomes evident. Throughout the document, the GSA stresses that design 
excellence cannot be accomplished within a vacuum and must include a multitude of 
stakeholders and experts at various stages of the infrastructure project. 
In addition to providing a design excellence framework for all contractors 
interested in building or rebuilding federal infrastructure, the GSA has also developed 
standards that must be followed. To achieve standards for safety and security, the GSA 
was supported by the Interagency Security Committee (ISC). Initiated by EO 12977 in 
1995, the group has published standards and best practices, which serve as foundational 
tools for federal buildings. Examples of the standards most recently published, which are 
For Official Use Only (FOUO) documents, are the following.48  
• March 2013/7th Edition—Design-Basis Threat  
• March 2008/1st Edition—Facility Security Level Determinations 
• April 2010/1st Edition—Physical Security Criteria for Federal Facilities  
 
45 General Services Administration, “Design and Construction Overview,” n.d., http://www.gsa.gov/ 
portal/content/104549?utm_source=PBS&utm_medium=print-radio&utm_term=HDR_1_Bldgs_design& 
utm_campaign=shortcuts. 
46 General Services Administration, Design Excellence: Policies and Procedures, 2004. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Department of Homeland Security, “Interagency Security Committee Standards and Best Practices,” 
n.d., https://www.dhs.gov/interagency-security-committee-standards-and-best-practices.  
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The aforementioned titles demonstrate the logical progression and path this 
committee has created for federal buildings to ensure they are safe and secure. First, it 
has a standard that identifies and communicates the threat and is updated bi-annually.49 
Second, it has a process that requires an asset be placed into a security level. Third, 
standard security criteria have been established that correlate with both the design-basis 
threat and the designated security level for the asset, and are mandated for inclusion 
through planning and design.  
These standards ensure components of the infrastructure project, which are non-
negotiable, such as baseline security practices, are never excluded from incorporation 
into the final design. Additionally, the ISC develops supplemental best practices and 
training courses to encourage federal stakeholders to push the safety and security bar 
even further. Even with all this effort and success in mandating standards, challenges still 
exist.  
One concern is that security can be taken too far and/or become inflexible. The 
Department of Defense may have been separated from the GSA’s purview for this very 
reason. The Guiding Principles for Federal Architecture encourages accessibility, 
incorporation of fine art, and the development of landscape.50 In May 2010, Barbara A. 
Nadel, FAIA, testified in front of the House Subcommittee on Economic Development, 
Public Buildings and Emergency Management concerning risk implications of applying 
Department of Defense standards in GSA lease procurements.51 Representing the 
American Institute of Architects, she highlighted the importance of completing a detailed 
risk assessment for planned new facilities, and stresses the importance of flexibility in 
determining levels of protection based upon the specific variables that may present 
themselves for each project. Additionally, highlighted several times within the discussion 
49 Department of Homeland Security, “Interagency Security Committee Standards and Best Practices.” 
50 U.S. General Services Administration, “Guiding Principles for Federal Architecture,” n.d., 
http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/136543.  
51 The American Institute of Architects, Statement of Barbara A. Nadel, Too Much for Too Little: 
Finding the Cost-Risk Balance for Protecting Federal Employees in Leased Facilities, House 
Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings and Emergency Management, May 20, 2010.  
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on risk assessment, Ms. Nadal focuses on the importance of “good intelligence” to inform 
“good design.” 
With “good design” as the goal, integration of all its components can be critical. 
When considering the many components that must be considered to protect from 
intrusion, blast, collisions, etc. the universe can become unmanageable. 
Security design is not rocket science, but for most building owners, design 
professionals, and public officials, integrating the many pieces of the 
security puzzle remains an increasingly challenging and complex art, one 
that can be mastered with proper guidance.52 
Firm, steady, and artful guidance is what the GSA has incorporated into its 
organizational policy to protect its stakeholders.  
B. COMPLEX GOVERNMENT: UNITED KINGDOM 
The United Kingdom has been combating terrorism and exploring methods to 
reduce the overall risk to its infrastructure and community since the early 20th century. 
NYS has leveraged this experience and best practices developed to implement programs 
within the state to combat terrorism. Perhaps the most recognized example is the manner 
in which NYC developed and modeled the Lower Manhattan Security Initiative after the 
pre-existing “Ring of Steel” developed in London. This smart practice transfer 
demonstrates how groups do not have to create a completely new idea or concept; strong 
partnerships and information sharing can give new plans a warm start. Similarly, some 
examples of their focus on security and incorporating it into design are also present. This 
effort provides a look into a complex government approach. 
Formed in 2007, the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) 
serves as one of the UK’s resources for addressing infrastructure protection within its 
borders. Established as an interdepartmental organization, it is comprised of specialists 
from a multitude of relevant government agencies and services from both the public and 
private arenas. Similar to the homeland security focuses established within NYS and 
52 Terry Leach, “Federally Owned or Leased Office Buildings: Security Design,” in Building Security: 
Handbook for Architectural Planning and Design, ed. Barbara Nadel (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 
2004), 1. 
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much of the country, the UK’s 2010 National Security Strategy placed particular 
emphasis on ensuring its infrastructure is secure and resilient.53 It also recognized the 
need to improve collaboration and relationships between all levels of government and the 
public/private sector with regard to this subject matter area. 
At first glance, CPNI and OCT-CI appear to be two parallel programs guided by 
homeland security strategies that are also in many ways aligned. However, their mission 
statements begin to show how their approach to tackling the challenges of infrastructure 
protection vary quite drastically. 
OCT-CI Mission 
The Critical Infrastructure Protection Unit supports federal, state and local 
comprehensive risk analysis to reduce the nation’s vulnerability to terrorism and 
deny the use of critical infrastructure as a weapon by implementing plans and 
programs that identify, catalog, prioritize, and protect people and assets in 
cooperation with all levels of government and private sector.  
 
CPNI Mission 
Act as an interdepartmental organization providing advice on information, 
physical and personnel security to businesses and organizations across the national 
infrastructure 
 
While both approaches could potentially lead to the same desired end state of 
protecting the community and its infrastructure, one acts as a change agent to the 
community through tangible and focused advice; the other leads a state effort by 
implementing plans and programs.  
CPNI focuses its efforts and advice in three major areas: threats, security advice, 
and security planning. These areas are explored in more detail to understand how they are 
implemented. 
53 David Cameron et al., “A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy,” 
Stationery Office, October 2010, http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/national-
security-strategy.pdf. 
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The National Risk Register54 (NRR) serves as a backbone document for the UK 
and CPNI activities, and provides a clear explanation for infrastructure areas that have 
been and currently are priorities for focus. According to the Cabinet Office, the NRR lays 
out its “assessment of the likelihood and potential impact of a range of different risks that 
may directly affect the UK.”55 For each threat identified by the team of experts, the 
document provides a description and overview of the background, risk, and mitigation 
work that has been accomplished to address the issue. These threats are then weighed 
against each other to allow the reader to understand them in the context of relative impact 
and likelihood (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4.  Graphic Showing Identified Threats from the NRR56 
 
54 Cabinet Office, “National Risk Register,” 2008, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ 
uploads/attachment_data/file/61929/CO_NationalRiskRegister_2012_acc.pdf.  
55 Cameron et al., “A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty the National Security Strategy.”  
56 Cabinet Office, “National Risk Register.” 
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With a secondary goal of spurring debate and discussion on the accuracy of the 
assessment, the document provides transparency and comprehensive logic to the overall 
community concerning the threat picture. From this, the United Kindgom is then able to 
provide supporting documents, such as the National Risk Register for Civil 
Emergencies,57 which explain in more detail how the community can better prepare itself 
for these threats. Finally, in support of CPNI activities, it more specifically provides a 
defined path from which to spend valuable resources to develop security advice to the 
communities in need of assistance. 
Currently on its third addition, Protecting Against Terrorism,58 serves as CPNI’s 
macro approach to providing security advice to the greater infrastructure community. 
Leveraging a stakeholder community that has been informed and educated through 
documents, such as the NRR, this document begins the next level of education on how to 
counter these threats. Proposed as a starting point, CPNI devotes significant time and 
energy to providing advice and examples of best practices in the areas of protective 
security, response planning, and security culture. 
Throughout the document, each section, whether focused on identification of 
vulnerabilities, development of site-specific plans, or understanding information security, 
provides understanding of what the topics is, why it is important, and how the individual 
or group can address the topic for their asset. Additionally, each section provides 
additional resources through which the stakeholders can learn more about the subject or 
take their actions to a higher level. Finally, a multitude of contacts and resources are 
shared with the reader to ensure the opportunity to follow up on outstanding issues or 
expand the knowledge base even further is available. 
 
57 Cabinet Office, “National Risk Register.” 
58 Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure, Protecting Against Terrorism: 3rd Edition, 
2010.  
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Developed in partnership with the Department for Transport and the British 
Transport Police, Security in the Design of Stations (SIDOS),59 illustrates how CPNI 
provides advice at a more micro level within the community. An effort, which is clearly 
supported by the risk picture, SIDOS, takes a detailed look into the security of stations. 
Thus, the common theme and emphasis on design within CPNI becomes evident. 
“Good design of the physical environment can reduce opportunities for crime, by 
making it harder to commit the crime.”60 Focusing its efforts on new or major 
redevelopments, CPNI and its partners utilize this document to ensure station 
stakeholders are investing their time and resources wisely and place the safety and 
security of stations to the forefront. Hence, the document reiterates that security must be 
an integral part of planning and design. 
Similar to Protecting Against Terrorism, SIDOS provides the stakeholders a more 
detailed overview of the threat picture to their infrastructure. However, this document 
then becomes very detailed in the areas that should be addressed for stations, such as 
station approach, building structure, and fabric. Specific recommendations are made that 
provide what type of material should be utilized and the mitigation effect it will have. 
As for most countries, although some great progress has been made in the area of 
infrastructure protection, the United Kingdom is not without issues and concerns within 
this area. The challenge of bridging the gap between relying on private industry to build 
and support much of the infrastructure and ensuring it is done in a safe and secure manner 
remains. Although the aforementioned overall process described takes the stakeholders 
through a logical path and progression, it remains voluntary and left to the infrastructure 
stakeholder’s discretion as to whether they follow the guidance. 
The challenges occurring at the Euston Terminal are an example of the ongoing 
issues.61 With its last reconstruction completed in 1962 (and poorly done in many 
59 Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure and British Transport Police, Security in the 
Design of Stations Guide, 2012.  
60 Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure and British Transport Police, Security in the 
Design of Stations Guide. 
61 Ike Ljeh, “Euston, We Have a Problem,” Building.Co.Uk, June 21, 2013, http://www.building.co. 
uk/euston-we-have-a-problem/5056620.article. 
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people’s eyes),62 this infrastructure was scheduled for a complete reconstruction to 
include the introduction of a high speed rail scheme (HS2). However, the complete 
redesign that would have included recommended security implementations as described 
previously was scrapped last year. With plans to leave the asset in its current state and 
simply add on the HS2 component, the safety and security concerns remain. 
Detailed review of CPNI’s infrastructure protection approach illustrates a 
program that has a clear mission and identified path to accomplish its ultimate goal of 
protecting the community and its infrastructure. Utilizing an integrated team of subject 
matter experts, CPNI can demonstrate to the stakeholder community its knowledge base 
and create specific work products (i.e., Protecting Against Terrorism and SIDOS) that 
relate to multiple infrastructure sectors. The United Kingdom has ensured its goal of 
providing security advice to stakeholders is first grounded by detailed threat assessment 
work. This step not only ensures the community is educated on the threats, but also 
understands why CPNI is focusing resources and partnerships on specific areas. In all 
areas in which consulting and guidance are provided, it ensures the information is 
explained, validated, and mitigation measures are offered. Finally, CPNI effectively 
partners and collaborates with other agencies to ensure the products are developed in a 
way in which actual recommendations can be made with confidence and supported by 
resource material. 
Recent publications by CPNI, such as SIDOS, previously described, and other 
works, such as the Integrated Security; A Public Realm Design Guide for Hostile Vehicle 
Mitigation,63 which addresses the threat of explosive devices and methods to design 
facilities to mitigate their effectiveness, demonstrate their focus on being a change agent 
prior to infrastructure being built or majorly reconstructed. Their role as advisor can be 
leveraged and utilized when the infrastructure is still conceptual. Understanding the 
potential long-term benefits, they champion concepts, such as crime preventions through 
environmental design and security by design. Thus, critical structural decisions, layouts, 
62 Jonathan Glancey, “Constructive Criticism: The Week in Architecture,” The Guardian, 2011.  
63 Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure, Integrated Security: A Public Realm Design 
Guide for Hostile Vehicle Mitigation, 2011.  
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and other key security protections can be implemented as part of the grand scheme and 
not added on later as an afterthought. 
In concert with CPNI’s efforts, the UK’s Design Council, recently merged with 
the Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment (CABE), demonstrates 
another example for how serious and important the United Kingdom believes properly 
designed infrastructure is for its community. As part of their Design Out Crime initiative 
in 2011, the group produced a document sharing case study examples in which the best 
practices for design were utilized and successful around the world. Within the document, 
several success stories are provided for the United Kingdom. 
One example is a major reconstruction project at Birmingham’s Heartland 
Hospital.64 Located in a dense urban area, this hospital struggled with preventing crime 
on its property. Benefiting from a safer hospitals initiative funded through the UK 
treasury, the hospital partnered with some experts on design and concepts, such as Crime 
Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). Evaluating concepts championed 
by CPTED, such as increasing surveillance through natural line of sight and defining 
visitor traffic flow, an 80% reduction in trouble for the area of focus was identified. 
Additionally, the case study showed that overall, the employees felt more secure within 
the redesigned area. 
Although the 2012 Olympics in London did include some significant security 
concerns and gaps, most notably, the contract issues for private security guards and the 
inability to provide the personnel promised. The planning and construction for this event 
provides another example for how the United Kingdom has been able to put the security 
design concept into practice. Focusing heavily on temporary facilities, CABE provided 
its services and input with regards to design guidance on a multitude of venues to include 
the hockey facilities and Olympic Park.65  
64 Home Office Design and Technology, Alliance Against Crime and the Design Council, Design Out 
Crime: Case Studies, Examples of Design Being Used to Tackle Crime Problems Around the World, 2011.  




                                                 
The complexities that exist within the infrastructure protection environments can 
be quite overwhelming. Through a review of some of the UK’s efforts, it is clear those 
problems, such as creating an effective public/private partnership model, cross 
international borders. However, their use of being a change agent through the 
development of an interdepartmental organization and providing focused advice are 
promising infrastructure protection design steps. 
C. PRIVATE SECTOR: WHOLE BUILDING DESIGN AND DESIGN BUILD 
Private industry has also taken steps forward on its own to advance the bar for 
safety and security concerning planning and design. Within the infrastructure 
environment, frameworks and organizations are being developed around concepts, such 
as design-build and whole building design. Although utilization of these tools and 
processes is voluntary, they carry with themselves fiscal incentives and savings that serve 
to entice new users. These concepts form a strategy and process to encourage excellence.  
The design-build concept approaches infrastructure projects from a non-
traditional contracting direction. The Design-Build Institute of America summarizes its 
process as “…an integrated approach that delivers design and construction services under 
one contract with a single point of responsibility.”66 
Unlike normal building design and contract practices, which shift responsibility 
between contractors as the project progresses, design-build keeps the responsibility under 
one united contract. Figure 5 shows how concepts like design-build are steadily growing 
and supported in the community of non-residential housing construction. 
66 Design-Build Institute of America, “About,” n.d., http://www.dbia.org/Pages/default.aspx.  
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Figure 5.  RCD/RSMeans Market Intelligence Graph67 
The design-build structure provides an opportunity for collaboration to occur 
within a planned framework and offers a defined methodology, which aims at improving 
a multitude of characteristics of the build. Within NYS, the use of design-build has 
progressively increased. Through the NY Works program, this concept is being 
communicated as the best path forward to rebuild the states infrastructure ensuring 
expedited development, reduction of overall costs, and all for “value engineering.”68  
The Kosciusko Bridge Project is a recent example of its use in NYS.69 
Leveraging federal and state funding, certified design-build teams are competing for the 
contract award to build a new bridge connecting Brooklyn and Queens. During this 
67 Reed Construction Data/RSMeans Market Intelligence, Design-Build Project Delivery Market 
Share and Market Size Report, 2013.  
68 New York State, “NY Works,” n.d., http://andrewcuomo.com/nyworks.  
69 NYS Department of Transportation, “Kosciuszko Bridge Project,” n.d., https://www.dot.ny.gov/ 
kbridge.  
 36 
                                                 
process, pre-qualified bidders will develop detailed proposal that communicate and 
consider all the required elements to build the required bridge. This process will require 
bidders to communicate how the planning, engineering, and design concept developed by 
their team will withstand safety and security considerations developed by the NYS 
Department of Transportation. 
A program within the National Institute of Building Sciences, the Whole Building 
Design Guide,70 demonstrates another platform focused on planning and design. A major 
goal is to ensure high levels of collaboration and coordination occur early in the planning 
and design phase. More specifically, the Whole Building Design Guide71 suggests that to 
design a safe and secure building effectively, it must be considered within a “total project 
context.” Utilizing multi-disciplinary teams, the proposed design must be evaluated 
against all relevant hazards the future asset may face. 
Core to this process is the need for the owner/operator to designate an owner’s 
representative. Within an environment that lacks clear standards, such as those developed 
by the GSA, this individual ensures all design work is in line with the owner/operators’ 
expectations and needs. This individual becomes the assets steward for the process flow 
described as follows.  
70 National Institute of Building Sciences, “Whole Building Design Guide.”  
71 Ibid. 
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Figure 6.  Whole Building Design Flow Chart72 
As visualized through the chart in Figure 6, in several critical areas (conduct 
assessments, develop tailored solutions, evaluate solutions), the inclusion of intelligence-
based analytical component and knowledgeable physical security expertise would be 
helpful to inform decision making. If these components are not incorporated early into 
the planning, engineering, and design phase, and are left until the review requirements 
portion of the process, the inclusion and/or consideration of these safety and security 
components will at best be band-aids to resolve the issue. In a worst-case scenario, issues 
that may have been possible to mitigate earlier within the planning phase may not be 
possible at all due to the final asset design. 
EPA Region 8 Headquarters provides an example of a new construction asset that 
utilized the process of design-build and whole building design.73 With a project team of 
approximately 11 people, the group established goals for areas such as the following.74 
• Secure/Safe 
72 WBDG Aesthetics Subcommittee, National Institute of Building Sciences, “Engage the Integrated 
Design Process,” Last updated November 5, 2012, http://www.wbdg.org/design/engage_process.php. 
73 National Institute of Building Sciences, “Whole Building Design Guide.” 
74 Ibid. 
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• Historic Preservation 
• Productive 
Leveraging the Whole Building Design Guide flow, multiple teams were established to 
accomplish these goals; however, integration and communication were important factors 
in achieving the goals.75 An important lesson learned shared from the project was that 
“Design-Build and design excellence should not be mutually exclusive.”76 The project 
also highlighted that if local stakeholders had been integrated earlier within the process, 
several unachieved goals may have been realized. 
Both The Design-Build Institute of America and The Whole Building Design 
Guide are non-governmental organizations, which serve to improve overall building 
design. They exist, however, due to the funding provided by contract awards (public and 
private) and other government funding. This fiscal incentive drives competition, which 
encourages solutions that benefit the infrastructure community. 
D. AGGREGATED ANALYSIS 
Although the approaches reviewed above vary concerning their role within the 
infrastructure community, each demonstrated a clear interest in enhancing safety and 
security through planning, engineering, and design. This common objective of desiring to 
influence changes during planning, engineering, and design demonstrates the significance 
of this phase. In addition to this common objective, several other similarities were 
identified. 
First, each approach established a process that would encourage early 




                                                 
be incorporated at a later phase of the planning, engineering, and design cycle, is not 
encouraged by many working at the cutting edge of this field in both the public and 
private sectors. Second, the concepts of integration and collaboration are present within 
each approach. Eliminating stovepipes and encouraging open discussion among different 
types of subject matter experts appears to be valued in each approach, despite their 
differences. Finally, although the path taken to identify expectations varied, each 
approach clearly identified its safety and security expectations, and worked to incorporate 
them into the project. Establishing a benchmark and/or standard for safety and security 
expectations allows participants to evaluate their progress and ultimate success 
throughout the planning and design phase. 
In addition to having commonalities, this review also brought to light differences 
among these approaches. Based upon their position and role within the infrastructure 
community, the approach naturally must vary to be effective. A private sector approach 
would likely be ineffective when attempting to apply a mandated incentive for 
participation as demonstrated by the GSA, simply because it is optimized for participants 
with differing sets of incentives. Likewise, it would be of less value for the GSA to utilize 
a purely fiscal incentive for its planning and design efforts since it already has control 
and ownership over its assets from start to finish. These nuances surrounding participant 
incentives become a very important consideration that must be evaluated and studied 
prior to implementing any new program. After all, if an organization developed an 
approach that would most certainly enhance safety and security, yet could not be 
effectively implemented through the group’s sphere of influence, little would be 
accomplished.  
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V. VARIETIES OF INCENTIVES FOR PARTICIPATION 
The aforementioned planning and design approaches demonstrate that within the 
infrastructure protection environment, varying levels of relationships and partnership 
exist. Perhaps the least complicated one (yet not without its issues) is the public-to-public 
infrastructure relationship. On the other hand, the most challenging is the public-to-
private infrastructure relationship. Many of these interactions are created or fostered by 
governments to affect change within their identified community of interest. To 
accomplish their various missions, governments have developed a range of solutions. 
These solutions vary from strictly voluntary to fiscally incentivized, as well as 
regulatory/mandatory programs. These options are explored in detail to understand the 
benefits and challenges that come with each.  
A. VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS 
Voluntary programs are utilized at multiple levels of government within the 
infrastructure protection community. Within the DHS, their Office of Infrastructure 
Protection offers multiple partnership opportunities to infrastructure stakeholders. 
Utilizing products like their Infrastructure Survey Tool (IST), Site Assistance Visits 
(SAV), and Computer Based Assessment Tool (CBAT), stakeholders are encouraged to 
open their doors and share detailed information, which can bring to light vulnerabilities 
and provide options for consideration to mitigate them. At the state and local level, 
similar programs exist to attempt to accomplish the same end state, more resilient 
infrastructure. Two examples of these efforts are the Initial Asset Visit (IAV) and 
Enhanced Visual Assessment Program (EVAP). These programs reflect a similar 
approach as described previously for the IST and CBAT, respectively.  
However, it is ultimately left to the sole discretion of the owners/operators as to 
whether they implement any of the recommendations provided by these voluntary 
programs. Understanding the cost burden recognized by including security 
enhancements, these partnerships often look for low cost, no cost solutions that are less 
problematic to implement, which does not necessarily mean however that these low cost, 
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no cost solutions are the highest priority mitigation recommendations. In some cases, 
major vulnerabilities identified are so cost prohibitive they simply must be recognized as 
existing and it is understood that a realistic mitigation option is not available. Very 
simply, the profit requirement will often stifle change. Often, these programs also provide 
owners, operators, or security personnel with “evidence” (i.e., outside assessments) to 
show their organizational leadership so that they may advocate on behalf of new or 
expanded security measures. 
At a minimum, these partnerships carry the safety and security torch forward to 
foster communication on the important topics and likely educate owner/operators on 
important vulnerabilities to consider. Additionally, as owner/operators provide 
information on their assets to receive final products, the government is compiling a large 
database of information on infrastructure and utilizing it to inform decision makers about 
this topic. However, the question remains; is enough value provided on its own to justify 
the expenses of these programs?  
B. FISCALLY INCENTIVIZED PROGRAMS 
Whereas regulatory and mandated programs could be referred to as utilizing “the 
stick” method, fiscally incentivized programs could be referred to as utilizing “the carrot” 
method. This type of incentive occurs both in the public and private sector and both areas 
are explored in this chapter. This approach works under the assumption that infrastructure 
owners/operators desire to implement safety and security mitigation measures; however, 
due to constraints (fiscal, personnel, time, etc.), they are unable to, which can nonetheless 
be accomplished through both direct and indirect approaches. 
Grant programs developed and/or managed by FEMA play a key role in providing 
an incentive for change. Two major programs, which come from FEMA, are the Fiscal 
Year 2013 Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) and the Fiscal Year 2013 Hazard 
Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP). While both programs strive to create a more resilient 
nation, the HMGP maintains a strict focus on natural hazards while the HSGP expands its 
focus towards not only terrorism but also other catastrophic events. 
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With $354,644,123 total funding available, the State Homeland Security Program 
(SHSP) is the core program housed within the HSGP. Requiring the submission of 
investment justifications, threat and hazard identification, and risk assessments and other 






Following the aforementioned guidelines, State Administrative Agencies (SAA) 
distribute fund directly to local entities, create sub-grant programs, and utilize the funds 
for state needs. Although this process affords flexibility in many respects, FEMA does 
restrict and manage what is considered allowable expenses. An example is the authorized 
equipment list.78 This list provides funded recipients a guide to determine if the 
equipment they wish to purchase is allowable under the program policy. Additionally, 
restrictions prevent the expenditure of funds on privately owned infrastructure.  
Alternatively programs, such as the HMGP, focus their efforts solely on natural 
hazards. In addition to the focused nature of mitigating threats, local entities are eligible 
to apply for the grant and compete for funding. Applicants must walk through a very 
detailed application process that communicates how they have addressed elements such 
as the following.79 
• Mitigation Planning 
• Technical Feasibility and Effectiveness 
• Floodplain Management and Protection of Wetlands 
• Environmental Planning and Historic Preservation Review and 
Compliance 
77 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FY 2013 Homeland Security Grant Program,” n.d., 
http://www.fema.gov/fy-2013-homeland-security-grant-program-hsgp-0.  
78 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Authorized Equipment List,” n.d., https://www.rkb.us/ 
mel.cfm?subtypeid=549.  
79 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Hazard Mitigation Assistance Unified Guidance, 2013.  
 43 
                                                 
• Cost-Effectiveness 
• Cost Review  
Although this process ensures stakeholders are approaching mitigation planning 
methodically and logically, the narrow focus on natural hazards can lead to planning and 
design flaws as described earlier within the problem area. While assisting in mitigation of 
certain threats, the program also encourages tunnel vision.  
Finally, fiscally incentivized tools can also be more indirect than grant programs. 
Leadership in Energy & Environmental Design (LEED) is a recent and successful 
example of this type of tool. Established as a third party tool to encourage the use of 
“green buildings,” the programs provide standards and a certification process to guide 
interested parties through the process of conserving energy, utilizing space effectively, 
and using natural resources appropriately.80 As a reward for certifying through this 
process, benefits include lower long-term operating costs, tax benefits, and zoning 
allowances. 
While improving energy efficiency and limiting the damage industry can do to the 
environment, programs, such as LEED, can have a negative impact on safety and 
security. An example would be the utilization of windows. Windows allow buildings to 
take advantage of the heat provided by the sun and limit the amount of artificial heat 
required to sustain a building. However, when concerned with the threat of an improvised 
explosive device, windows on a building provide little protection from an attack and can 
become secondary projectiles and cause additional injuries. Finding a balance between 
being “green” and secure can be quite challenging, even something as simple as the use 
of outdoor lighting at night can cause conflict.81 
C. REGULATIONS AND MANDATORY PROGRAMS 
The use of regulations and mandatory requirements to accomplish goals and 
affect change has also been utilized at all levels of government in the infrastructure 
80 U.S. Green Building Council, “Leadership in Energy & Environmental Design,” n.d., http://www. 
usgbc.org/leed. 
81 Laura Spadanuta, “The Greening of Security,” Security Management, n.d. 
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sphere. Over history, the use of building codes has been widely accepted and 
implemented for fire protection, public health, and engineering, yet no comparable set of 
security codes exists.82 As described earlier, at the federal level, mandatory criteria and 
standards have been adopted to bridge the lack of security codes. However, many state 
and local government organizations have not attempted anything similar.83 It is not 
difficult to understand why an overarching security code has not yet been realized, as risk 
levels are context specific and not universal. The threat posed to the community by man-
made attacks is an intelligent, flexible, and multipronged one, and a far less common one 
than, for example, the risk of fire. Codes that have been adapted to mitigate risks created 
by natural hazards do not have to concern themselves with a selective and adaptive foe. It 
is simple to justify their implementation because anyone could be affected without 
requiring the justification of threat information. 
Another form of regulation seen within the infrastructure community comes from 
the oversight role, most common with sectors seen as “utilities.” This type of regulation 
exists in areas, such as the energy sector. Certain community services are considered by 
the government to be so crucial for the community that regulations must be placed on 
providers to ensure continuity and quality. This focus aims to ensure services are 
provided to the community at an appropriate cost, and that enough resilience is built into 
the system that it can withstand common and likely hazards. This type of regulation is 
also seen on infrastructure, which could prove harmful to the community by its improper 
use or obtained with malicious intent through theft and diversion—like in the chemical or 
nuclear sectors. Unlike the voluntary programs, these regulations and mandates can carry 
an operational and/or fiscal penalty, which forces the hand of the owner/operator to 
maintain compliance with the required rules. In this regard, desired changes, which are 
implemented through regulation or mandate, can be very effective. 
However, regulations and mandates are not without problems. A recent example 
demonstrating some of the problems that can develop is the Chemical Facilities Anti-
82 Walter “Skip” Adams and Deborah A. Somers, “Codes, Standards, and Guidelines for Security 
Planning and Design” in Building Security: Handbook for Architectural Planning and Design, ed. Barbara 
Nadel (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2004), 3. 
83 Ibid. 
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Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program within the DHS. Created by government to 
improve security at facilities with dangerous chemical, serious questions are being raised 
about their ability to implement the program effectively.84 Programs, such as CFATS, 
require a large office to manage and operate the program with taxpaying dollars funding 
the efforts.  
Most recently, an explosion at a fertilizer plant in Texas demonstrates the gaping 
holes that can exist within these programs. This plant carried quantities of ammonium 
nitrate that clearly fall above the threshold amounts that should have placed them under 
CFATS control and required submission of security plans and inspections; however, the 
last time the company had a federal inspection conducted was 28 years ago.85 Outliers, 
such as this plant, can fall through regulatory cracks for many reasons including but not 
limited to the failure to self-identify themselves, improper communication of chemical 
inventories, and limited inspection resources focused on higher tiered assets. Whatever 
the reason may be for the asset slipping through the cracks, it demonstrates the fallible 
nature of regulations and mandates.  
Such regulatory approaches are also far more coercive than those relying on 
financial incentives or voluntary participation. Both economic (among owners/operators) 
and ideological or philosophical (among those opposed to government intervention in 
markets) have caused objections to such regulations. In both cases, these reasonable 
objections must be taken very seriously and balanced with community needs and other 
values like resilience. 
D. SYNTHESIS 
Each aforementioned participation model discussed has multiple sub-layers that 
provide options for consideration when striving to accomplish a desired outcome. While 
approaching a complex matter, such as infrastructure protection, it is unlikely that one 
solution solves the safety and security problem on its own. It is more likely that multiple 
84 U.S. House of Representatives Chairman Fred Upton, Congressional Leaders Express Reservations 
about Extending CFATS Funding in Light of Program’s Failures, Energy & Commerce Committee, 2013.  
85 Adam Estes, “The Exploding Fertilizer Plant in Texas Hadn’t Had a Full Inspection in Three 
Decades,” The Atlantic Wire, 2013.  
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methods and models are required to be utilized and interwoven amongst each other. 
Concerning incorporating safety and security into planning, engineering, and design, 
stakeholders should consider their role within this community and evaluate their 
capabilities to affect change.  
The participation models reviewed previously each carry with them an intrinsic 
coercion value. An increasing coercion value for a well-managed and executed program 
has a greater likelihood of achieving the goal established. Figure 7 is a basic 
representation of this increasing coercion value.  
 
Figure 7.  Coercion Value Scale to Accomplish Desired Outcomes 
It should be noted (as discussed in several examples earlier) that although the 
coercion value can impact achievement of a desired goal, it is not the only required value 
to consider. A poorly managed and executed regulatory program may cause more harm 
than good and be less effective than a well-executed voluntary program. Additionally, 
regulatory programs impose costs on industry, and owners/operators, and at a certain 
point, such costs may outweigh the “upside” of increased security. However, a well 
managed and executed regulatory or mandated program can accomplish the desired goal. 
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The review of the GSA and its development of a mandated safety and security program 
demonstrates how such a program can be effectively implemented. Leadership 
determined that safety and security measures must be incorporated into federal buildings; 
a team was designated to develop a logical process to accomplish the directive, standards 
were issued, and oversight was established to ensure the standards were being followed. 
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VI. NEW MODEL FOR NEW YORK STATE 
Recognizing DHSES’s place in infrastructure protection within NYS, the 
following proposal is a new approach to improve safety and security for the state’s 
infrastructure and the community that relies on it. This plan will not address all 
infrastructure sectors and assets within the state; it will focus on areas over which the 
state has authority and/or significant influence. A goal is to interweave new approaches 
that improve the aggregate and mitigates safety and security risks within this setting. 
Below are two new approaches for the state to consider for implementation. Both 
approaches would be tailored to address new and majorly reconstructed infrastructure.86 
A. STATE OWNED AND LEASED INFRASTRUCTURE 
Similar to the GSA at the federal level, the Office of General Services (OGS) is 
responsible for the management and administration of state owned buildings within NYS. 
To accomplish this task, the OGS has several groups that include but are not limited to 
building administration, real estate services and design and construction that share these 
responsibilities. Currently, within the OGS, mandated security standards for state owned 
buildings do not exist. Although within the building administration group, a security and 
emergency management unit exists to assist with security projects,87 and several state 
agencies have developed their own standards,88 the inclusion of security elements within 
buildings remains voluntary.  
1. Recommendation 
NYS should develop and publish standards with which any new or majorly 
reconstructed state owned buildings are required to be in compliance. Additionally, these 
standards should include requirements for leased state buildings. If NYS is to begin to 
86 Majorly reconstructed infrastructure for this plan is defined as total or partial replacement of 
structure; not including a sum of partial replacement totaling less than 40 percent.  




                                                 
champion the concepts of incorporating increased levels of safety and security into the 
planning, engineering, and design phase, it must start internally. Albert Einstein once 
said, “Setting an example is not the main means of influencing another, it is the only 
means.”89 
2. Benefits  
By implementing standards for new buildings, ones that will be undergoing major 
reconstruction and new lease agreements, the state could begin an incremental process of 
improving safety and security at state owned and leased buildings. This method for 
change would ensure progress is made without shocking the system that would require all 
existing assets to comply with a new standard.  
The participation incentives analysis demonstrated that if the development of 
mandatory programs is possible, this form of influence can be the greatest. Additionally, 
with the OGS having similar roles and responsibilities as the GSA, the simple 
government approach developed by the latter could likely be leveraged to begin the 
development of state standards and practices. The GSA has demonstrated excellence 
within this field and has developed a method to provide flexibility that would also be 
needed in NYS. 
3. Challenges 
The first major challenge faced is persuading the OGS leadership and state 
leadership to move forward with the recommendation. Switching from a voluntary 
practice to a mandatory one, which would impact most state entities including imposing 
real costs on them, will likely face resistance. Major factors for resistance may include 
the following. 
• Fiscal Concerns: Although incorporating improved security measures 
during planning and design is less costly than doing so once an asset has 
been built, it remains an expense. Any increased expenses for state owned 
assets will likely be challenging for agency budgets and plans. NYS, like 
states across the country, remains in a challenging economic environment 
and concerns over increased spending cannot be overlooked.  
89 Glenn Van Ekeren, Words for all Occasions (Rowe, MA: Prentice Hall, 1988), 234.  
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• Relinquishment of Authority: With the inclusion and implementation of 
security measures delegated to the individual agency, individual 
leadership groups may be hesitant to relinquish that authority. Leadership 
may view it as a less beneficial process than their previously developed 
internal policies. Most mandatory policies face resistance from those to 
whom they limit the discretion. 
• Perceived Lack of Threat: Although NYS has been the subject of terrorism 
attacks in recent history, the vast majority of NYS owned assets have not 
been successfully attacked. Agency leadership may argue that the overall 
risk to the state does not justify the need to develop and implement 
standards. 
Another challenge faced is the development and execution of the proposed 
standards. As previously discussed, a mandated program is only successful if it is 
developed and executed well. Development and execution of this recommendation will 
require personnel commitment from multiple agencies to develop, publish, implement, 
and update—as well as the creation of a training program to share such standards with 
relevant agency stakeholders. 
4. Next Steps 
To begin forward movement on this recommendation, DHSES leadership should 
meet with OGS leadership and representatives from the Governor’s office to discuss any 
proposed change. The path towards implementation could be recommended in three 
phases and address challenges described previously. 
First, the existing OGS, Security and Emergency Management Unit, could be 
charged with developing draft standards that could be considered for approval and use on 
state owned and leased buildings. Leveraging this unit would likely relieve some of the 
concerns related to the relinquishment of authority as this group is already established 
and is charged with protecting personnel and structures under the OGS’s control.90 To 
accomplish this task, the DHSES would assign personnel to assist the unit and its existing 
membership. A primary requirement of this group would be to determine the scale and 
scope of what “state owned and leased buildings” should include. A major role for 
DHSES within this group would be to develop threat briefings, present on, and inform 
90 Office of General Services, “Security and Emergency Management Unit.” 
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agency leadership about threat picture for NYS owned buildings. Additional preliminary 
requirements would include the development of stakeholder outreach and communication 
methods, fiscal impact studies, as well as of a plan to update leadership regularly on 
progress. 
Second, once the preliminary work is completed and approved by leadership, the 
unit and supporting membership will draft standards to be applied to new buildings, 
buildings undergoing major reconstruction, and leased buildings. This approach would 
allow the state to incur the additional expenses related to improving safety and security 
gradually, and not overburden an already constrained fiscal environment. As 
demonstrated by the GSA, these standards should include three core components: design 
basis threat, facility security level determinations, and physical security criteria. Once 
drafted, opportunities should be provided to all interested agencies to review and 
comment on the draft standards.  
Finally, once approved and provided to all agencies, the unit should maintain 
oversight on implementation of the standards. Ensuring compliance with the standards 
will be an important element to ensure success. Additionally, the standards should be 
reviewed and updated on a yearly basis as necessary to ensure they are current and 
address the threats that NYS faces. 
B. STATE FINANCED INFRASTRUCTURE 
Another area in which NYS has direct influence on new or majorly reconstructed 
infrastructure is through financial support. A recent example is under the NY Works 
program championed by Governor Andrew Cuomo, in which an effort is underway to 
“rebuild NY’s infrastructure.”91 Leveraging an aggregate of available federal and state 
funds, the group will earmark resources to support economic development or 
transportation infrastructure projects.92 Throughout this research process, it has been 
demonstrated that “good intelligence” and establishing a baseline threat picture is  
 
91 New York State, “NY Works.” 
92 Ibid. 
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important to the planning and design process. Through the utilization of such fiscal 
incentive participation tools, enhanced safety and security processes could be attached as 
a requirement for selected projects. 
1. Recommendation 
Where NYS funds are provided to assist with the creation of a new infrastructure 
asset or major reconstruction project, the bidding and procurement process requires the 
development and inclusion of a DBT, and subsequent development of security 
performance specifications.93 
2. Benefits 
Unlike the relatively simple approach that can be taken for government buildings, 
applying safety and security to other infrastructure types can vary greatly. To influence 
change over this vast range of asset types can be very challenging that requires an even 
more flexible and adaptive approach. Unlike the aforementioned first recommendation 
provided, many of the projects that would be included in this category are not under the 
OGS’s control, which provides the DHSES the opportunity to take the lead and champion 
the concept of incorporating safety and security components through planning and 
design. By requiring an early partnership with the infrastructure owner/operator and the 
DHSES prior to the planning and design phase for state financed infrastructure projects, 
the state can ensure that the safety and security discussion is incorporated early in the 
process and is communicated as a requirement. Leveraging skills sets resident within the 
DHSES and existing expertise within the owner/operator group, the assigned team can 
focus the planning and design process on relevant threats, and require communication 
concerning how their proposed design would withstand the identified threats. This 
process would be utilized to assist the determination of a final contract award. 
93 Department of Defense, Defense Standardization Program, “Frequently Asked Questions about 
Performance Specifications,” n.d., http://www.dsp.dla.mil/APP_UIL/displayPage.aspx?action=content 
&accounttype=displayHTML&contentid=28. 
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3. Challenges 
NYS provides funds connected to infrastructure in one form or another through 
multiple avenues. It is possible that the universe, which this recommendation would 
affect, will be larger than the chosen DBT development team could handle. To mitigate 
this issue, a minimum project monetary threshold may need to be considered to ensure 
the scale and scope is one that NYS can manage effectively. 
This process also requires effective collaboration between the infrastructure 
owner/operator and the assigned DHSES team. Included within the DBT, the DHSES 
will share a detailed threat assessment, which will provide information, such as 
historically related incidents, attack methods, and recent trends. This product will then 
need to be leveraged in collaboration with all stakeholders to apply the completed threat 
assessment to the actual infrastructure to complete the DBT. To ensure sensitive 
information is protected from release to unauthorized personnel, a project specific non-
disclosure process will be leveraged. Once complete, the owner/operator team will be 
ultimately responsible for publishing the final DBT and security performance 
specification. If the owners/operators either do not buy into the process or do not agree 
with the discussed threats, the final version provided to bidders may lead to responses 
that do not significantly address safety and security.  
Finally, the current staffing available within the DHSES to accomplish this work 
would create several concerns. Like many agencies, the personnel who would be assigned 
to accomplish this work within the DHSES already have assigned tasks and 
responsibilities. Leadership would have to either make a decision to reprioritize efforts, 
discontinue programs and/or hire new personnel. Additionally, the flexibility allowed in 
this approach may vary the type of infrastructure projects that the DHSES is involved 
with greatly. Projects could swing dramatically from transportation structures to water 
and wastewater facilities. This variance could challenge the expertise available with the 
DHSES to create informed DBT products that truly contribute to the process. It is 
extremely unlikely that the DHSES would be able to hire subject matter experts for every 
sector; therefore, a more creative and flexible approach to mitigating this issue will have 
to be established—perhaps utilizing contractors, part-time personnel, or employees 
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temporarily detailed for a specific timeframe to supplement existing expertise. 
Developing an uninformed DBT could potentially do more harm than good as resources 
would end up being spent in unneeded areas.  
4. Next Steps 
As an initial step, DHSES leadership should meet with the Department of Budget 
(DOB) to discover the scale and scope of NYS fund distribution to new and major 
reconstruction projects to inform the process and assist with understanding whether a 
minimum project monetary threshold should be included in the proposal. To ensure the 
team does not take on more than it can handle, it is recommended that the threshold err of 
the side of a higher monetary threshold than a lower one. Once completed, the concern of 
taking on more than the existing team can handle will be mitigated.  
Second, the DHSES should meet with those responsible for managing the 
“Rebuild NY” State Infrastructure Bank94 to discuss the concept of requiring funded 
projects to include a DBT product and security performance specifications. If this process 
is initiated prior to funds being awarded, it should limit the ability for owner/operator 
groups to resist or challenge its inclusion. It would be suggested that a pilot period be 
utilized to test the concept and allow for evaluation prior to full implementation. This test 
period will allow the DHSES to gauge how effectively the assigned team and 
owner/operators collaborate together. Since a regulatory/mandatory incentive is not being 
utilized, it will be very important to measure success qualitatively for the pilot period. If 
collaboration does not work well during this period, a more stringent approach may need 
to be developed, and a reevaluation will be necessary.  
Third, once the concept has been agreed upon, a DBT team will need to be 
developed internally within the DHSES, and the OCT would be the most appropriate 
office to be assigned this duty. Leveraging individuals from the Critical Infrastructure 
Protection Unit and the Intelligence and Analysis Unit, a core group could be formed to 
focus on this task. To accomplish this task with the least impact to current operations, 
additional personnel would be required to be hired by the office. For the initial pilot 
94 New York State, “NY Works.” 
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period, the addition of one full time equivalent to both the Critical Infrastructure 
Protection Unit and the Intelligence and Analysis Unit would provide the staffing needs.  
Fourth, to address the concerns regarding a lack of subject matter expertise, two 
realistic options are available. First, leveraging the DHSES’s state role in which both 
federal and local assets are relatively accessed with ease, the group could focus on 
building networks, which could be utilized for information when necessary. Additionally, 
NYS has a multitude of agencies, which could be leveraged when working on a particular 
infrastructure type. One example would be a hospital project; the DBT team could work 
closely with the NYS Department of Health to obtain the subject matter expertise it may 
be lacking. Another option would be to develop a pool of part-time personnel who could 
be brought on for specific projects. An example of this type of pool exists within the 
NYS Office of Emergency Management, Public Assistance Liaison Program,95 which 
was created in 1998. Now working under a new title of Disaster Assistance 
Representatives, these individuals are interviewed and evaluated for particular subject 
matter expertise and then kept in an inactive status until their skill set is needed. When an 
incident occurs that requires their expertise, they are offered the opportunity to be 
brought on for a period of time.  
Prior to, and during, the pilot phase, the available group should be tasked with 
reviewing existing DBT models (such as the one utilized by the IAEA) and developing a 
rational standard process. This process would work the group through each required step 
of developing a DBT. Additionally, it would provide options for obtaining the necessary 
subject matter expertise.  
Finally, once all those steps have been completed, the program could move to the 
execution phase, in which the partnership between the DHSES and the owner/operator 
stakeholders can be tested and evaluated. Developed DBTs would be incorporated with 
owner/operator knowledge to design performance specifications, which would be 
included in the request for proposals. Final products included within the bidding process 
will demonstrate if the goals of incorporating an informed safety and security process are 
95 New York State, Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services, “Public Assistance 
Liaison Program,” n.d., http://www.dhses.ny.gov/oem/recovery/pal-program.cfm. 
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being met. The pilot period will also allow time to review responses from bidders and 
develop an understanding as to whether bidders are responding in a favorable manner to 
the performance specifications.  
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Protecting NYS’s infrastructure is a responsibility that many different 
stakeholders are charged with both in the public and private sectors. As responsible 
government employees, those charged with protecting the state’s infrastructure should 
ensure the programs and works being completed are done so effectively and efficiently.  
Two research questions were asked in this thesis. 
• What are the benefits and challenges of NYS placing a greater focus on 
the planning, engineering and design phase for new or majorly 
reconstructed infrastructure?  
• How could a new partnership model at the state level be designed to 
support infrastructure protection activities during this phase?  
Prior to answering these questions, an intensive literature review was conducted 
to explore efforts in this field within both the public and private realm. A structured and 
focused analysis was then completed on several approaches of groups that demonstrated 
action in this field. During this analysis, it became evident that the participation incentive 
utilized to accomplish the identified goals was a core component for success in 
developing a new program. Understanding this component, additional analysis was 
completed on the identified varieties of participation incentives.  
Through research on infrastructure challenges facing NYS and the United States, 
several issues (reacting to an event, risk issues, etc.) were identified and demonstrate the 
complexity of this issue. Recognizing that, once built, infrastructure exists and is utilized 
for long timeframes, and later cycle adjustments and security improvements are very 
expensive, it is critical that these assets are initially constructed to the highest quality in 
all regards.  
Overall, this change in focus for NYS into the planning, engineering, and design 
environment will greatly assist the state’s infrastructure for the long term. Starting this 
process by first improving state owned buildings would demonstrate to the community 
that NYS takes this subject matter seriously. This process will also allow the DHSES the 
opportunity to continue to improve its expertise in enhancing safety and security through 
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planning, engineering, and design. Additionally, requiring security to be a focus for assets 
that receive state funds will demonstrate to contractors and the community the same 
priorities. Leveraging the DBT process to guide the development of performance 
specification with owner/operators will ensure this new process is appropriately focused. 
To be successful, NYS must also recognize its limitations. Many different 
approaches and participation models can be leveraged, stretching resources too thin by 
attempting too many could be counterproductive. Multiple challenges exist that should be 
evaluated in depth and clearly understood, as seen in the Appendix. Lessons learned from 
recent regulatory programs, such as CFATS, teach government to be pragmatic with an 
identified approach and not to stretch resources too thin. CFATS demonstrated that 
understaffing a program can lead to frustrations at both the owners/operators and 
legislative levels. Staffing concerns are a real issue for the DHSES as these 
recommendations are explored and cannot be taken lightly. 
Although focused effort will be placed on mandatory participation models, this 
does not discourage the use of other voluntary and fiscally incentivized tools, particularly 
for the broader world of privately owned and funded infrastructure. It may be challenging 
to evaluate the effectiveness of these approaches; however, at the very least, they support 
the safety and security narrative. Hopefully, the aggregate of all these approaches by 
stakeholders supports the overall goal of creating a resilient state.  
Finally, more research should be done to ascertain the effectiveness of programs 
being implemented in this field. Surveying the owners/operators of the infrastructure on 
which these programs are focused could potentially provide detailed insight into their 
value. Findings from surveys targeted on the varying types of partnership incentive tools 






Yes:  Although incorporating improved security measures during planning 
and design is less costly than doing so once an asset has been built, it 
remains an expense.  Any increased expenses for state owned assets will 
likely be challenging for agency budgets and plans.
Yes:  By requiring security measures to be incorporated within 
the bidding process it will ultimately affect the bottom line of 
bidder proposals.
Relinquishment of Authority 
Yes:  With the inclusion and implementation of security measures 
delegated to the individual agency there may be hesitancy by individual 
leadership groups to relinquish that authority.  Leadership may view this 
as a less beneficial process than their previously developed internal 
policies.  
No:  This process will be executed on a contract by contract 
basis and will face the authority challenges recognized by state-
owned buildings.  To receive state finacing for the infrastructure 
project it will simply be a requirement built into the agreement.
Perceived Lack of Threat
Yes:  Affected leadership may argue that the overall risk to the group 
does not justify the need to develop and implement standards.
Yes:  The collaboration portion of this process requires an 
effective partnership between the developer of the DBT and 
the owner/operator.  If the owner/operator does not support 
the threat findings the final product may be impacted negatively.
Complicated Process
No:  Representing a simple government approach once the mandate and 
standards have been issued there should be a clear and uncomplicated 
path to follow.
Yes:  Unlike the mandated process, this will require a flexible 
approach which must be tailored to the infrastructure type for 
each new project.  It will require involvment of subject matter 
expertise and sound teamwork.
Staffing Constraints
Yes:  Although staffing issues can be mitigated by reivigorating existing 
units and partnerships the efforts required to create standards and 
manage the process will require previously unplanned for staff hours.
Yes:  This will require hiring additional staff to fill these roles 
and periodically leveraging other available subject matter 
experts.
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